# Who's Afraid of Work? (Unemployment and the "end of labour")

#### By Jannis Milios and Elias Ioakimoglou

#### 1. Introduction

Increasing unemployment rates in most developed capitalist countries has been approached, in many cases, as an "inevitable outcome" of technological innovation, and most specifically of the introduction in all sectors of the economy of automated production units, based on the applications of microelectronics. In this ideological framework, an analysis was formulated, which claims that the "new technologies" and the automation of production will constantly accelerate unemployment, leading thus to the ultimate "end of labour".

The subject of this paper is this rather peculiar ideological use of the phenomenon of automation asserting the imminent end of labour. In sections 2 and 3 we will approach the history and the content of these conceptions. In the following section 4 we will deal with some statistical evidence, which will help us to comprehend the actual effects of automation to employment and the labour force. In this way we will be able, in the last section of our paper, to trace the economic, social and ideological realignments (and antagonisms) which have brought to the fore the ideology of the end of labour, bearing in mind that every theory or would-be theory articulates and/or supports particular standpoints in an ongoing dispute for ideological domination in contemporary societies.

#### 2. A Hundred Years On. A Renewed Fashion for Paradoxical Conceits

The proclaimed "end of labour" did not make its first appearance in the present "computer age". The hypothesis that the replacement of labour by automated systems would lead to the "disappearance of the working class" was formulated almost a century ago in the context of a theoretical discussion of capitalist crises. In his book *Studien zur Theorie und Geschichte der Handelskrisen in England* (Studies on the Theory and Practice of Trade Crises in England), Jena 1901, M. von Tugan-Baranowski gave an elegant description of the continual replacement of labour by systems of mechanised functions, only to assert, however that even if machines cause the working class to disappear completely, capitalist production will continue to exist. With his analysis, Baranowski attempted to theoretically exclude the possibility of a collapse of capitalism through mass underconsumption triggered by the gradual disappearance of wage labour and thus of workers' income and workers' *consumption*. In Tugan-Baranowski's analysis, the reduction in individual consumption (and in the production of consumer goods) is counterbalanced by the continual increase in productive consumption (and production of capital goods) (Milios 1994).

"Even Tugan-Baranowski wrote characteristically: the most comprehensive replacement of workers by machines could not in itself make any machine superfluous or valueless. Even if every worker except one had been replaced by machines, then one single worker would keep the entire colossus of machines in motion and with their help produce new machines and means of consumption for the capitalist class. The working class will disappear. But that will not in the least hinder a realisation of the products of capitalist industry (...) If the capitalists, however, wish to restrict their own consumption in their urge for accumulation, there is nothing to stop this. In this case, the production of means of consumption for the capitalists will be restricted so that a still greater share of the social product will consist of means of production" (quoted in Bukharin 1972, p. 211-12, where there is extensive reference to and criticism of the views of Tugan-Baranowski).

Criticising both Baranowski's views on the "end of the working class" and Luxemburg's thesis of underconsumption, from the viewpoint of a theory of crises of overaccumulation, Bukharin (1972) showed that the increase in labour productivity arising from the replacement of workers by machines necessarily entails an increase not only in the production of capital goods but also - albeit at a slower rate - of the production of consumer goods: the means of production are (sought after and) produced so that production of consumer goods can also continue on a broadened base, forming specific ratios between these two sectors of production. This means, however, that the reproduction of capitalist economy on an expanded scale, not to mention its very existence, is contingent on a continual expansion of consumer demand over a long period of time, as stated also by Marx in his famous schemes of *reproduction and circulation of the total*  *social capital* (Marx 1992, Part Three, pp. 425-599). If one approaches the problem from the point of view of *reproduction* of the economy, labour incomes and the workers' consumption cannot disappear:

"The huge expansion of means of production would unavoidably lead to a huge increase in *the means of consumption placed on the market*. And if there were no demand for these means of consumption, there would take place an unavoidable and devastating collapse, in which precisely that connection between production and consumption whose existence is denied by our 'paradoxical' Tugan would come into force with primitive violence (...) It makes absolutely no difference to the matter that Tugan still keeps 'one worker' to accomplish this humbug, for if this 'one worker' were ordered by his clever bosses to produce coal and iron for coal and iron, this would have the same economic importance as if he were forced to spit at the ceiling all day long" (Bukharin 1972, p. 213).

The time-honoured prophecy concerning the imminent demise or disappearance of the working class (and concomitant perpetuation of capitalism) was preserved in a latent state in the writings of philosophers, economists and sociologists, to make a triumphant comeback in the last decade, unencumbered now by the theoretical trappings of the past. We no longer have to do with theoretical analyses of expanded reproduction of the capitalist system or of capitalist crises but merely with a stereotyped and endlessly reiterated assertion (in articles, books, declarations by politicians and experts etc.) that increasing unemployment is on the point of achieving a total marginalisation of labour. What is involved, in other words, is the projection of a quasi-journalistic "hunch" about the way things are going, to some extent explicable from the way that "the end of labour" is a subject increasingly preoccupying the press. Subsequently, taking this hunch as something given, as more or less a *fait accompli*, conclusions are drawn concerning society, economic policy and the fate of humanity.

As far as purportedly "radical" analyses are concerned, the "end of labour" thesis has been promoted systematically since the early 80s by André Gorz.: "The micro-electronic revolution is ushering in the epoch of the abolition of work. Wage labour can no longer constitute the primary focus of an individual's life or even his principal occupation" (Gorz, 1986, pp. 53 & 56). From the thesis on the end of labour, Gorz draws the corresponding political conclusions, putting forward the proposition that we should reject capitalism but accept the "logic of capital" and strive for a democratic and ecologically balanced community, beyond class differences and antagonisms: "We must learn to distinguish between capitalism and the logic of capital. The logic of capital is the only clear form of economic logic. There is no other economically rational method of operation for a business enterprise. There is of course a movement, a transformation process, a lateral alliance transcending inter-class boundaries. Each one of us, for example, knows some capitalist or other, some executive in a chemical company who, as a human being, experiences misgivings over what he is doing and wonders how, when he is on his deathbed, his life's work will be judged and what his greatgrandchildren will think of him" (Gorz 1993, pp.165 & 167).

It seems that the exponents of the "end of labour" thesis suffer from a repetition compulsion which induces them to publish essays and books containing a stereotyped reiteration of the same point: that wage labour is on its last legs. A typical specimen is the book by J. Rifkin (1996) in which we are informed yet again that "the Information Age has arrived. In the years ahead, new more sophisticated software technologies are going to bring civilization ever closer to a near-workerless world" (p. xv). It seems that in the writer's view it is not only labour which is on the point of disappearing but energy and materials too: Rifkin foresees, therefore "the shift from an economy based on material, energy and labor to one based on information and communication" (p. 236). It seems that "information and communication" will be filling stomachs, building houses, making clothes, automobiles, air-planes.

One particularly interesting sidelight on Rifkin's book (1996) is the plaudits it has received from such luminaries as the Nobel-prize winning economist Wasily Leontief, and also from the press (in Greece the *Kathimerini* of Sunday 4.8.96, in Germany the *Frankfurter Rundschau* of 21.03.97 to take just two instances).<sup>1</sup>

The book bases its "end of work" thesis on the one hand on anecdotal evidence and citations from ordinary people or opinion-makers<sup>2</sup> and on the other on a description of the immanent long-term consequences for employment of the

increase in labour productivity, *always* brought about by capitalist development: *"In 1961* (...) the Steel Workers Union reported a loss of 95,000 jobs, while production increased 121 percent" (p. 67, emphasis added: J.M.)

Rifkin (1996) exposes the travails of the working class (oppression, deteriorating of living conditions and undermining of the health of a large part of the work force, see in particular p. 194) but presents them as a result of the "new technologies". He intersperses this argument with a series of topics from the fashionable discourse of the last decades: a smattering of "Toyota-ism" (p. 99), a dash of globalisation and transcendence of the nation state (pp. 235-36), a sprinkling of ecology (p. 246) and a generous serving of "empirical sociology": "a one percent rise unemployment results in a 6.7 percent increase in homocides, a 3.4 percent increase in violent crimes, and a 2.4 percent increase in property crimes (...) teenage criminal activity escalates from individual acts of terror to full-scale rioting, as was the case in Los Angeles in 1992" (pp. 208 & 210).

Apart from the statistical fun and games, what is amazing is that none of this argumentation wants to be perceived as referring to a permanent tendency of the capitalist mode of production, a tendency which as early as the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century was already being elegantly "denounced" by economists such as Malthus and Sismondi. Otherwise formulated, the view concerning the "end of work" masks the fact that despite extremely rapid increases in labour productivity due to technological and organisational "modernisation" of capitalist enterprises, the long-term employment trend is still for the number of job vacancies to rise, (albeit at a much slower rate in relation to the total volume of production).

The "end of labour" thesis is paradoxical: Despite the capitalist overaccumulation crisis of the last two decades (Ioakimoglou & Milios 1993), more than 85% of the workforce in the advanced capitalist countries (Europe, North America, South-East Asia) remains in employment. Amid all the rhetoric on the "end of labour" the exploitation of the great majority of the population who work (i.e. the reality of the capitalist mode of production) is pushed aside. It is not worth talking about - that is the view. And not only that. Because unemployment is reduced to a by-product of technical progress as such, social relations are once again placed out of bounds for discussion. In this ideological context of capitalist apologetics, assertions such as Gorz's that "the logic of capitalism is the only clear form of economic logic" (Gorz 1993, p. 165) can only be described as redundant - symptoms of the repetition compulsion.

### 3. A "post-Marxian" analysis?

The thesis on the "end of labour" has also been adopted by certain theoreticians who consider themselves Marxist thinkers, typically by A. Schaff (1995). These approaches are in no way to be distinguished from the run-of-the-mill literature on the "end of labour" we have just presented, other than in their "Marxist" transcription of certain terminological features: the "end of the proletariat", the "end of surplus labour" etc. Nevertheless, the insistence with which these theoreticians assert their "Marxism" obliges them to argue that their own departure from Marxist tenets is exclusively a product of the fact that "end of labour" phenomena made their appearance in the post-Marx era. To quote a characteristic remark of Schaff's: "we should at the very least rewrite Marx's 'Capital' and the 'Finance Capital' of Hilferding" (Schaff 1995 p. 108).

We indicated above that Tugan-Baranowski had outlined an "end of labour" thesis as early as 1901. What is worth noting here is that the idea of the "end of labour" forms part of the early thought of Marx when he began to elaborate the framework of his theoretical system, which he named the Critique of Political Economy. As is well-known, Marx began to formulate his economic concepts in the 1850s (Milios 1997) and the first extensive text to which he lent his signature, primarily as a personal settling of conceptual accounts, was the *Grundrisse* (1857-58). After the publication of his book A Critique of Political Economy in 1859 up to the publication of the first volume of Capital in 1867, Marx not only changed the overall plan of his work but also revised some conceptual content of his theory, for example through abandoning the concept of "capital in general" and introducing the concept of "social capital" (Heinrich 1986).

Thus in the *Grundrisse* we find Marx flirting with ideas of the "end of labour" and with it the end of capitalism, as a result of the application of science to production: "Labour no longer appears so much to be included within the production process; rather, the human being comes to relate more as watchman and regulator of the production process itself (...) He steps to the side of the production process instead of being its chief actor (...) As soon as labour in the direct form has ceased to be the great well-spring of wealth, labour time ceases and must cease to be its measure, and hence exchange value [must cease to be the measure] of use value. The *surplus labour of the mass* has ceased to be the condition for the development of general wealth, just as the *non-labour of the few*, for the development of the general powers of the human head. With that, production based on exchange value breaks down" (Marx 1993, p. 705).

Marx's flirt in the *Grundrisse* with the "end of labour" was not to progress beyond the formulation of a "moving contradiction": "Capital itself is the moving contradiction, [in] that it presses to reduce labour time to a minimum, while it posits labour time, on the other side, as sole measure and source of wealth. Hence it diminishes labour time in the necessary form so as to increase it in the superfluous form" (Marx 1993, p. 706).

Marx was once more to take up exactly the same issues in *Capital*, but this time without the slightest reference to the "end of labour". A new concept was formulated here, on the basis of which Marx examined the changing relationship between necessary labour (i.e. labour necessary for the reproduction of the labour power of the worker) and surplus labour (which is appropriated by the capitalist): this was the concept of *relative surplus value*, only hints of which can be detected in the *Grundrisse*. Marx dedicates to the examination of relative surplus value all the fourth part of the first volume of *Capital* (Chapters 12-16). He analyses in this section the consequences for labour productivity not only of machinery but also of cooperation and the division of labour. Increases in the productivity of labour are seen as synonymous with reductions in necessary labour time for the production of a unit of any commodity (Heinrich 1996, pp. 202 ff.).

We see, therefore, that the problematic of reduced labour time per unit of produced commodities, or in other words the perpetual increase in labour productivity, occupies a central position in the theoretical system of Marx. It does not however lead to paradoxical conceits like the "end of labour" thesis, not because the technological data of the time did not permit such thoughts, but because the concepts of extended reproduction of capitalist relations of production (and exploitation) point to a radically different problematic: the problematic of surplus value appropriated by capital and its tendency to increase, the problematic of accelerated accumulation of capital, in combination with growing individual consumption (albeit at a lower rate), the theory of capitalist crises and of the workers' reserve army of the unemployed.


Contrary, elements of an "end of labour" problematic are to be found only in the early stages of development of Marx's theory, only to be abandoned immediately afterwards. From a theoretical viewpoint, the "end of labour" thesis belongs to a period preceding the formulation of the Marxist system of the Critique of Political Economy.

## 4. Statistical evidence and the "end of work"

Our analysis so far has shown that the "end of labour" problematic is neither new, nor is it embedded in a well defined conceptual framework. It constitutes a loose affirmation, based on partial evidence provided by a number of single cases. In this section of the paper we are going to critically examine the evidence provided by Rifkin's best-seller on the "end of work", by taking also into consideration the available macroeconomic data, which Rifkin and the other supporters of the "end of work" thesis do not bother to investigate.

The conclusions of Rifkin (1996) are based on a great number of stories on changes that took place in US businesses. The method, as already mentioned, is simple and journalistic: First, any company forecast, for example, that in the commercial banks and savings institutions, the introduction of computer technologies will result in the loss of 30% to 40% of jobs within the next few years, is considered by Rifkin as an accurate estimate. Second, all the stories reported by business executives are assembled to draw conclusions about the economy as a whole. Third, and most important, Rifkin's story-based conclusions mismatch with aggregate statistical data. Examining data from national accounts, Rifkin would have discovered ten years after Solow, that "we can see the computer age everywhere except in productivity statistics": during the last twenty-two years, despite stepped-up introduction of new technologies into the labour processes, productivity is not accelerating in the G-7 countries (OECD 1996). In the USA, the rate of economic growth, in the long-term, is stabilised at around 2.5%. The increase in labour productivity from 1983 to the present has an equally steady long-term trend: it grows at the average pace of 1% annually.<sup>3</sup> As far as employment is concerned, firstly, it is increasing at a high rate --compared with European figures, and secondly, it's growth rate exceeds the growth rate of labour productivity.

To sum up, the low unemployment rate in the US, i.e. in a country in which new information-technologies are widespread, supports the view that the number of new jobs created during a period of profound technological changes is comparable to the number of jobs lost. The case of Japan does not also offer a basis for technophobia. Productivity in this country follows a downward path since the beginning of the '90s, and employment is falling due to the slowdown in GDP growth rates. (See the following Diagrams).



The only area that could provide technophobic ideologies a good example, is the European Union, since it showed a decrease in employment during the first half of the 1990s. Nevertheless, employment has again been on the rise since 1995 and in 1998 it is expected to approach the all-time highs of 1991. The fall in employment during the period from 1991 to 1994 cannot be attributed to the increase in productivity of labour, as the latter shows a steady long-term trend of about 2% --a level lower than that of the '70s. On the contrary, changes in employment, as can be seen in the above Diagram, depend strongly on output changes: the fall in employment in the 1991-1994 period should be attributed to the slowdown in GDP during that period.

It should also be examined whether the increases in the productivity index (net product per hour of work) and the reductions in employment in Europe during the recession of the '90s, stem from factors other than technological progress, such as shutdown of less efficient units of production, organisational changes, labour intensification and other types of changes that could bring about a reduction in staff without a decrease in production. In other words, apart from new technologies, other factors should also be examined, since employment as recorded in statistical data is the resultant of the action of many factors: some of them increase the number of workers, while others decrease it. Instead, Rifkin's *End of Work* is characterised by a confusion of technological progress with other factors which cause employment to fall. To take only one example, the phenomenon of *downsizing* is attributed to new technologies, whereas it actually has little to do with them (Thurow 1996). In the case of downsizing, changes of a rather transitory nature are taken by Rifkin to be permanent (Doug Heywood 1994 & *The Economist* 8.6.96).

In conclusion, even the simplest analysis of statistical data invalidates Rifkin's thesis that the introduction of new technologies, as a factor reducing employment, outweighs all the other factors driving in the opposite direction (i.e. in the direction of increasing employment). If such were the case, then the rate of employment growth, as recorded in macroeconomic statistical data should be decreasing; however, this happens only as an exception, and when it does happen, it is not necessarily due to technological progress.<sup>4</sup> Since employment has not declined (except in certain cases, in certain countries and for certain brief periods), we should conclude that during the last twenty years the factors driving in the direction of increasing employment have outweighed the factors that act in the direction of decreasing it (one of which is the substitution of labour by machinery).

Obviously, employment comes about as a result of processes which are more complex than the simple introduction of new technologies into production --processes related to macroeconomic policy, to changes in the institutional framework of labour relations and the working time, to profitability and accumulation of capital, to the shift from industry to the services etc.

Rifkin refers also to a reduction of employment in the services sector. However, employment in the US services sector increased in the period from 1979 to 1993 at an average annual rate of 2.2% (that is a 25% increase per decade). In Japan, employment in the services sector increased during the same period at exactly the same rate, whereas in the European Union the average annual rate of increase was 1.8%. The service sector therefore shows no signs of weakening, as regards its ability to create new jobs (a finding, however, which does not hold either for the agricultural sector or for manufacturing industry). There are no signs of weakening, either in the "traditional" services (commerce, transport, telecommunications, financial services, services to businesses), or in the new products, such as services of "social nature", personal services, etc. Particularly with regard to the latter, the structural crisis is apparently leading to the generation of new services, and of new jobs related to the crisis of family structures and their complementary domestic labour process,<sup>5</sup> the accelerated ageing of the population and the increasing medical care, the growing presence of women in the labour market, the loosening of social cohesion and the subsequent rise in insecurity.

On the basis of the above statistical evidence, the *jobless-growth* theory, embraced zealously by all current trends in technophobia, should be questioned. In the OECD countries as a whole, *employment intensity*<sup>6</sup> (which is the elasticity of employment to changes of GDP) is rather increasing.<sup>7</sup> For every percentage point of GDP increase, the percentage increase in employment tends to rise: simply put, growth creates more jobs than before.

# 5. Individual maximisation of benefit or the society of insecure and exploited labour?

To round off our analysis we return to the question formulated in the introduction: Why is it that the idea of the "end of work", which has always been an element, though not a very important one, in the thinking of certain philosophers and social scientists, is given special emphasis in specific historical conjunctures, when unemployment rises above a certain level and becomes difficult to manage? Given that all the preceding convinces us that almost everyone, even the ideologists of the "end of labour", are aware that most of the workforce in the developed capitalist countries (more than 90% in North America and South East Asia; more than 85% in Europe) are in employment and will continue to be so,<sup>8</sup> the answer must be sought not in some chance delusion but in the more general ideological outcomes of the conjuncture.

In the realm of economic thought and the ideologies associated with it, two currents have been in conflict for more than a century: on the one hand the heterodox and radical conceptions which perceive the (capitalist) economy and society as a society of labour and have since the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century been under the hegemony (as a rule and in most countries) of some variant of Marxist theories (emphasising the exploitative character of capitalist productive relations), and on the other the "orthodox" neoclassical conceptions which define capitalist society as a society of "harmony of interests" and subjective utility.

Neoclassical theory is by definition of apologetic intent. It presents as reality the imagined maximisation of benefit of all "economic subjects" (the producer-entrepreneur and the consumer), which is defined through an axiomatic correlation of the use value of the commodity (or of the "utility" to be derived from the provision of an additional unit of it) with the rationality, inherent in capitalism, of profit maximisation. It postulates, therefore, as an axiom that the "equilibrium" of the market (and the interplay of supply and demand in which it has its origins) arises from the simultaneous maximisation of the "marginal utility" to the consumer and the profit of the capitalist. Its claim to scientific status amounts to nothing more than a justification of its quest for models which might represent the supposedly self-evident harmony of the market (equilibrium) *and* society (maximisation of benefit to "all those in possession of factors of production", that is to say, workers and capitalists).

Within the framework of this apologetic edifice, individuals are free to decide how to allot their time between "leisure" (which offers them "satisfaction") and work (which brings them income), in such a way as to achieve a maximisation of benefit. A precondition, therefore, for the "maximisation of benefit" to wage earners is their ability to regulate the duration of their labour time. When, in periods of increased unemployment, it becomes obvious that the notion of such a choice is nothing more than a stupid fantasy deriving from the "theory", the entire apologetic edifice of "social harmony" and "utility maximisation" is overturned.

Once, therefore, the reality of unemployment exposes neoclassical theory for the hot air it is, there emerges the picture of a society of insecure labour, labour threatened by unemployment, workers suffering exploitation, forfeiting traditional rights, reaping an ever smaller proportion of the fruits of their labours.

Capitalist exploitation is gaining ground today. The firmness or rottenness of this ground, however, is a factor of the degree of persuasiveness and legitimacy of capitalist relations in the eyes of those suffering the exploitation. The paradoxical conceits concerning an economy where electronic computers and robots will, alone, carry out all the tasks of production, the notions of "end of work" all serve precisely this ideological strategy: they seek to obscure the grim picture of capitalist exploitation, of insecure and exploited labour, and to project a picture of technological determinism, whose negative side-effects can be healed by charity, voluntary work and "social sensitivity". But social antagonisms can not be conjured away with ideological smoke and mirrors.

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<sup>1</sup> As we are informed by the Greek newspaper *Ta Nea* (07.05.96), reprinting a relevant article from *Le Monde*: "Philosophers, sociologists, intellectuals and specialists characterise labour as a value under threat, analyse the transformations taking place in society and even go so far as to predict the end of labour. All, or almost all, adopt certain of the positions of the great philosopher Hanna Arendt, who wrote in 1958: 'In a few decades automation will probably have emptied the factories and liberated mankind from its oldest and most natural burden - the burden of labour'." In consequence, on the basis of the fact that unemployment (can it credibly be depicted as "liberation of humanity"?) is affecting more and more people, the newspaper wonders "if we should continue to attribute to a practice which is in danger of disappearing the role and the value assigned to it by a succession of industrial generations".

<sup>2</sup> Among hundreds of similar examples: "Economist Stephen Roach of Morgan Stanley says that …" (p. 143), "one of the laid-off workers was Joe Vandegrift, a forty-six-year-old mill mechanic who …" (p. 165), "Economist Jared Bernstein, of the Economic Policy Institute, argues that …", (p. 168), "John Parker, who lives in a wealthy suburban community along Philadelphia's Main Line …" (p. 170), "A local librarian, Ann Kajdasz says …" (p. 171), "Author and political analyst Kevin Phillips worries about …" (p. 177), "Some military experts believe that …" (p. 215).

<sup>3</sup> Even an upward trend in labour productivity which appeared in the early '90s and provoked many comments and analyses of what was happening in the American economy appears to have been, to a large extent, the result of a statistical inaccuracy: both investments in machinery and productivity of labour in the US were revised downwards due to changes in American national accounts ("Croissance américaine: lentement mais surement", *Alternatives Economiques*, Octobre 1996).

<sup>4</sup> Moreover, the changes in capital intensity, i.e. in the technical composition of capital, do not necessary reflect changes in technology.

<sup>5</sup> For a description of the crisis in the domestic labour process and family structures in the US, see L.C. Thurow (1996).

<sup>6</sup> White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment of the European Commission, 1993.

<sup>7</sup> The rate of change in employment has remained steady in the long-run, despite the fact that the rate of economic growth has fallen (*Technology, Productivity and Job Creation*, OECD 1996).

<sup>8</sup> Even Rifkin (1996), who has filled hundreds of pages reiterating his view that "a near-workerless world is fast approaching" (p. 106) must finally admit that "most people, in the foreseeable future, will still have to work in the formal market economy to make a living" (p. 249).